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BOOK REVIEWS
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY.

By Cornelius W. Gillam.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960. Pp. x, 239. $4.75. A generation

ago Mr. Justice Cardozo observed that "the assault upon the citadel of privity
is proceeding in these days apace." : The observation was accurate enough at the
time; it is even more so today. In a recent article, Dean Prosser examines the
course of the battle, concluding that "a goodly part of the citadel still holds out;
but the assault goes on with unabated vigor." 2 The present book is yet another
potent weapon thrown into the struggle, and it will doubtless contribute to the
almost certain limitation, if not demise, of the privity defense in products liability
cases.
The author concentrates upon the automobile industry. The basic problem
can be simply stated. Manufacturer sells an automobile to Dealer, who in turn
sells to Consumer. There is no contract between Manufacturer and Consumer; they
are not in privity. What recourse, then, does Consumer have against Manufacturer for defects in the product? His complaint is usually double-barrelled: tort
(negligence) and (contract) warranty. Tort recoveries are common, but the stubborn privity concept has thwarted attempts to succeed on breach of warranty.
Since the impetus furnished by the familiar MacPherson v. Buick Co.,3 decided in
1916, American courts have achieved virtual unanimity in holding an automobile
manufacturer liable for defects in design or manufacture caused by its negligence.
However, not until this year has an appellate court squarely held that such a
manufacturer
is accountable to the ultimate consumer on a theory of implied
4
warranty.

There is no dearth of literature in this field. And with but few exceptions,
the message is the same: "Privity's gotta go." Mr. Gillam is with the majority,
but he undertakes more than a limited analysis of judicial decisions. He is intent
upon considering industrial responsibility for product defects under all relevant
aspects-business, economic and ethical. He even expresses the hope of finding
"significant clues to the development of a social philosophy of law." 5 In this
respect, he rightly perceives that, historically, attitudes toward the general doctrine
of caveat emptor and its variants have largely determined the precise obligations
of a seller and remedies of a buyer. But his pre-Winterbottom v. Wright (1842))
history is sketchy and at points very misleading. For example, Mr. Gillam states
that "the origin of caveat emptor is the medieval Christian belief that business is
outside the law." 6 Whatever else it might be, caveat emptor is neither medieval
nor Christian. Indeed, studies which the author cites refute his statement. 7 As
Tawney, among others, has clearly demonstrated, there was no room in medieval
1 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
2 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960).
3 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
5 Text at vii.
6 Id. at 20.
7 "Caveat emptor is not to be found among the reputable ideas of the Middle Ages.
As custom of trade or rule of law it is not to be met with upon the highways of medieval
culture." Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALn L.J. 1133, 1136 (1931).
To begin with, it [caveat emptor] is not very ancient. It goes back only
to about the time of Coke, and marks a new individuality of thought and
custom current in his time and found in the frontier days of our own
country. . . . It was not a legal principle of the Middle Ages, nor is it
found in the Roman Law, despite its Latin expression. LeViness, Caveat
Emptor Versus Caveat Venditor, 7 MD. L. REv. 177, 178 (1943).

103

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
theory for a view that would exempt any human actions from moral scrutiny.'
As he put it,

[E]conomic interests [were] subordinate to the real business of life,
which is salvation, and . . . economic conduct is one aspect of personal
conduct, upon which, as on other parts of it, the rules of morality are
binding. 9
According to Tawney,
The most fundamental difference between medieval and modern economic thought consists.., in the fact that, whereas the latter normally refers
to economic expediency, however it may be interpreted, for the justification
of any particular action, policy, or system of organization, the former starts
from the position that there is a moral authority to which considerations of
economic expediency must be subordinated. 10
The usual criticism is that there was too much of a tendency to "legislate morals,"
with the restrictions on usury advanced as a prime exhibit. Once off on a false
start, Mr. Gillam compounds the error when he writes that "laissez faire and the
Industrial Revolution modified the principle of caveat emptor as they destroyed
the conditions under which it was tolerable." 11 The plain fact is that caveat emptor
never gained wide acceptance until the triumph of laissez faire economics.
Had this book been delayed in publication for a few weeks the author could
have added a most fitting climax. For Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 2
decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in May of this year, has the promise
of starting the judicial breakthrough which Mr. Gillam proposes. The format is
typical, and the court deals with the problems in a decisive and forthright manner.
Claus Henningsen purchased a new Plymouth from Bloomfield Motors and gave
it to his wife, Helen, as a Mother's Day gift. Ten days later while Helen was
driving the car, there was an apparent failure in the steering mechanism and she
sustained serious personal injuries. The car had 468 miles on the speedometer at
the time. Helen sued both the dealer and the manufacturer, Chrysler Corporation,
claiming both negligence and breach of warranty. The husband joined in the
action. The negligence counts were dismissed by the trial court, but the cause
was submitted to the jury for determination solely on the issue of implied warranty
of merchantability. Substantial verdicts were returned against both defendants.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed. There was a dual privity
problem here. Chrysler did not sell to Claus, and Helen was not in privity with
either the dealer or the manufacturer. After an exhaustive review of authorities,
the court holds that "when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream
of trade and promotes its purchase by the public, an implied warranty that it is
reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate
purchaser." 13 Moreover, the court disregards Helen's lack of privity, stating as
follows:
It is our opinion that an implied warranty of merchantability chargeable
to either an automobile manufacturer or a dealer extends to the purchaser
of the car, members of his family, and to other persons occupying or using
it with his consent. It would be wholly opposed to reality to say that use
by such persons is not within the anticipation of parties to such a warranty
of reasonable suitability of an automobile for ordinary highway 4operation.
Those persons must be considered within the distributive chain.'
Finally, the court makes a sharp attack on the uniform warranty of the Automobile
Manufacturers Association, the standard form in use in the industry, which limits
all warranty obligation to
making good at its factory any part or parts . . . which shall, within
8

9
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11
12
13
14

TAwNEY,

RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM

Id. at 34.
Id. at 41-42.
Text at 21.
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
Id. at 84.
Id. at 100.

(Mentor Book ed. 1952).
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ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaser
or before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event shall
first occur, be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid and which
its examination shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective... 15

In holding the added disclaimer violative of public policy and hence no bar to
the instant actions, the court does not equivocate, as the following excerpts will
attest:
The warranty before us is a standardized form designed for mass use.
It is imposed upon the automobile consumer. He takes it or leaves it,
and he must take it to buy an automobile. No bargaining is engaged in
with respect to it. In fact, the dealer through whom it comes to the buyer
is without authority to alter it; his function is ministerial-simply to
deliver it. . . . Such control and limitation of his remedies are inimical to
the public welfare and, at the very least, call for great care by the courts
to avoid injustice through application of strict common-law principles of
freedom of contract.: 6
Caveat venditor!

If, as seems likely, the views expressed in Henningsen gain more judicial
acceptance, the way may be opened for real progress in the area. Not that the
frontal attack on privity and invalidation of the standard warranty is the answer,
but because the need for serious study and compromise will become more urgent
and apparent. This is not a simple "either-or" proposition. The choices are not
confined to maintenance of the privity defense in all its strictness or the wholesale
abandonment of it. Nor is the latter alternative made more acceptable by indicating how the risks may be insured against and the cost of the insurance borne
by the consuming public. The question remains: what risks? What should be
the extent of a manufacturer's liability for defects in the product not shown to
have resulted from negligence on its part? What type of warranty is fair under
the circumstances? What of disclaimers? Answers to these questions can only
come from far greater effort than has heretofore been expended. Perhaps there
will be solutions on an industry-by-industry basis. And there will surely be the
need for some legislation. It is one of the merits of Mr. Gillam's book that it is
calculated to hasten the day when such action will be undertaken.
Edward J. Murphy*
THE COR'ORArION IN MODERN SocmTY. Edward S. Mason, Editor. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. xv, 335. $6.75.
Our grandfathers quarreled with corporations because, as the phrase
went, they were "soulless." But out of the common denominator of the
decision-making machinery, some sort of consensus of mind is emerging,

by compulsion as1 it were, which for good or ill is acting surprisingly like
a collective soul.
Adolph A. Berle

Editor Mason, in a detailed introduction, and Berle, opening the work with
a foreword, join with 13 writers in this ambitious attempt to evaluate the place
of the corporation in the midst of social and economic revolution. Most of the
essays can be said to deal with corporate economics, one with political significance
and three with international activity. Twelve of the 14 contributors, not counting
Berle, are educators.
A not surprising concentration on the problem of external control of the American commercial corporation necessarily results in a thorough survey of the engines
of corporate supervision. Abran Chayes2 discusses control in terms of stockholders,
workers, consumers and government. The same theme is echoed in an evaluation
15

Id. at 74.

16
*

Id. at 87.
B.S., LL.B., Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.

I

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION

2

Professor of Law, Harvard University.

183 (1954).
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of corporate management by Yale Law School's Dean Eugene V. Rostow. Like
Berle, Dean Rostow sees the present era as one of increasing public responsibility
on the part of corporate officials -what he calls "the birth of a more benign stage
in the evolution of capitalism." 3 And, in pricing, he sees the economic pressures
that have developed historically as the only present, reliable means of control; this
is true even in the so-called "endocratic" corporate organization, where management is separated from ownership. He hints that he favors profit control by government as a solution to private economic dictatorship, a solution which possibly
overlooks the necessity for attracting investment which was4 emphasized in these
pages by Professor David McCord Wright a few months ago.
Kingman Brewster 5 argues for what he calls a "federal solution" to the control
problem, a theory which has the conspicuous virtue of recognizing the corporation
as a political fact, as well as an economic force. Its darker side is a concept of state
control which operates - as do many of these essays - on the unspoken assumption that management presents an ominous threat to the American economy, if
not to democracy itself. Brewster looks for control of corporate investment through
both proscription and incentive. "If investable private capital can be deconcentrated, then government should be better able to influence the pattern of investment in the public interest without resort to public investment." 6
The book's first attempt to analyze existing corporate power is in the fifth essay,
by Carl Kaysen, Harvard economics professor. Management is dangerous, he notes,
only when the impact of its decisions reaches beyond the immediate business
environment in which the decisions are made. It is dangerous at this point because
it is answerable neither to stockholders - business democracy being a myth nor to government - antitrust regulation being largely unable to achieve its
purposes. The result is a business oligarchy. Kaysen sees the choice as one between
this "business society" and a perhaps more individualistic sort of republic. The
solution, he says, is a device to enforce moral and social values on corporate
management -a
thesis which denies Dean Rostow's belief that corporate management in its "benign stage" has reached those values without compulsion. Kaysen
concludes:
The development of mechanisms which will change the internal organization of the corporation, and define more closely and represent more
presently the interests to which corporate management should respond and
the goals
toward which they should strive is yet to begin, if it is to come
7
at all.

W. Lloyd Warner" presents some of the book's more thought-provoking content
in an analysis of "The Corporation Man." The educational level of the corporate
executive is rising more rapidly than the national educational level generally.
This, according to Warner, is evidence of greater democracy in corporate ladderclimbing, a conclusion that assumes but does not state that discrimination against
the non-degreed is somehow nobler than discrimination against the unpropertied.
The "organization man" impulse in corporate personnel management militates,
Warner believes, against the ends which business should be promoting. An
"autonomous" man is more likely to develop the spirit and adopt the values of a
democratic society and a free enterprise economy; and the growth in educational
standards and the present high level of mobility in corporate management may be
promoting that kind of autonomy.
Management-labor contact is treated by Neil W. Chamberlain of the Ford
Foundation. The labor contest as he sees it is exclusively economic. And the labor
3 Text at 60.
4 Growing Union Power and the Public Interest, 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 617 (1960).
5 Professor of Law, Harvard University.
6 Text at 83.
7 Id. at 105.
8 University Professor of Social Research, Michigan State University.
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movement, one of the primary economic factors in this contest, is not really a
movement at all because it lacks a social program; its force is a dollar force and,
because it is economic in the narrow, pressure-group sense, Chamberlain calls it
reactionary. 9 Since the bloodiest battlefields in the conflict are in the past, there
is now no meaningful social struggle:
It is probable that never before has there existed a labor movement which
has voluntarily so well integrated itself with its society. And indeed, where
the worker-driven Chevrolet has become almost indistinguishable from the
employer-driven Cadillac, why should the worker feel himself divided from
a superior class? 10
Labor leaders have no political power, in this analysis- at least not in opposition

to the power of corporate management. The union official is a sort of Babbitt in
bib overalls. He is neither economically nor idealistically prepared for a class
struggle, and corporate management perpetuates his ambivalence by making bitter
mountains out of wage-raise mole hills, a carefully created and artificial bickering
which nmmizes union power while it sustains the internal power of union officials.
Invention and technological development have largely passed from private and
governmental hands to corporate enterprise, an aspect of corporate power discussed
in these essays by Jacob Schmookler. 11 Corporations now do around three-fourths
of all inventing, and a greater proportion of the developing of inventions. In
contrast to the thesis of Berle, that economic progress has almost ended product
competition, Schmookler's argument is that product competition accounts for the

high incidence of corporate research activity in the United States, and the lack of
product competition accounts for the lack of corporate research in nations like
Great Britain. But, if industry does the experimenting, government pays for it.
More than half of the research and development bills in the United States are
paid by the federal government and a higher proportion of the cost of "pure
science," non-commercial research, is borne by the taxpayer. Schmookler's conclusion is that even more government aid is necessary; he advocates abolition of the

patent system, which, he says, discourages inventor initiative, and institution of a
system of government bounties for useful inventions.
The four-fifths of the book that is devoted to corporate economics is completed by essays on corporate finance by John Lintnere

2

and corporate satellites by

Norton E. Long.13 Lintner notes that nonfinancial corporations control major
fractions of the nation's real estate, tangible assets, equities, and private debts.14
In meeting the thesis of some earlier chapters- that big corporate management
is an economic sponge- he notes that 55 to 60 per cent of the internal resources
of American corporations are used for expansion and that the larger the corporation is, the greater the percentage of its profits it distributes to its stockholders.
Long regrets the passing of the local factory owner, with his feudal landlord
influence on the community, and the coming of his replacement, the itinerant
executive-trainee from the home office. Johnny-come-lately branch managers lack
the influence and prestige of the 19th-century factory owner, in Long's observation,
as well as the ability to make community decisions and to lead community projects,
which, consequently, are now managed on a sort of "everybody-is-a-hired-hand"
plan. Branch managers are "more the representatives of a foreign power than the
rightful chiefs of the local tribe." 15
Internal corporate affairs are treated in a chapter by Earl Lathari' 6 which

9 Text at 124-25; cf. David McCord Wright, Growing Union Power and the Public
Interest, 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 621-24 (1960).
10 Text at 125.
11 Associate Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota.
12 Professor in the Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University.
13 Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University.
14 Text at 173-77.
15 Id. at 214-15.
16 John B. Eastman, Professor of Political Science, Amherst College.
-
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takes its main force from the apparently demonstrable fact that large corporate
personnel structures stifle initiative as effectively as does the commune.
In the name of free enterprise, corporate collectivism has made deep
inroads upon the celebrated individualism of the economy, and corporate
welfarism has gone an equal distance toward tranquilizing the historic
initiative of the individual in a smother of narcotic "togetherness." 17

Modem corporate organization is a prototype of the 20th-century welfare state.
The internal corporate structures carry their recognizable trappings -political
parties, an executive elite, figurehead leadership carefully avoiding interference
with a well-entrenched bureaucratic control, systems of rewards and punishments
and an attitude toward employees that Latham calls the "bureaucratization of
benevolence." 18
The picture of corporate management as a baronage in three-button suits
lends itself well to an analysis of the British corporation by C.A.R. Crosland, and
of the Soviet industrial structure by Harvard economics professor Alexander
Gerschenkron. The synthesis of these essays is that corporate managementunder the American system of modified free enterprise, under the British system
of democratic nationalization, and under the totalitarian nationalization in the
Soviet Union - is essentially similar in attitudes, personnel and power. In a vague
way, in all three systems, management - even though effectively separated from
investment - works for the good of investors. This is so in the Soviet Union
because, as Gerschenkron observes, as long as management produces profits, the
totalitarian regime will leave it to its own devices; and in England this is true, by
Crosland's estimate, because of a vague sense of duty in management not unlike
that which presumably impels a last-term elected official to give the position his
best efforts. (One can almost hear Crosland say that bureaucratic management
works devotedly for the British taxpayer because it would not be cricket to do
anything else.)
In a mature industrial society like Great Britain's, the conclusion is inevitable
that nationalization as a means of corporate control serves no purpose that fear
of government interference and moral responsibility were not serving as well before
nationalization. For the adolescent industrial society in Russia, Gerschenkron
describes a corporate management which in its ethic, its conduct, and its status
symbols bears marked resemblance to America's robber barons of two generations
ago.. And government tolerates this bourgeois anomaly because production and
profit perpetuate dictatorial power.
The finishing touch on this complex is an essay on the operations of American
corporations abroad by Raymond Vernon. 19 Pressures on foreign investors and
technologists, he notes, are threefold: from the host government, from the Soviet
Union, and from the American diplomatic authority. The problem, as Vernon sees
it, is to meet the needs of the first, compete with the second, and serve the ultimate
ends of the third. The last problem, the immediate problem, is one of finding the
right coercive devices for making international corporate operations the enlightened
tools of American foreign policy. His solution is a corollary of free enterprise: furnish American technology from private industry, without the usual concomitant
American industrial control. He seems to favor government ownership of industry
in depressed areas, on the theory that, once industry is on its feet, these governments will turn control back to private investors. American technicians can then
sell their services either to the foreign governments or to the American government,
with only the know-how and none of the dominance being exported.
17 Text at 218.
18 Id. at 232.
19 Professor in the Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University.
This is the third from last essay, the Crosland and Gerschenkron works coming later in the
book. But, in one sense at least, it forms a logical conclusion for what might be called the
book's "foreign" section.
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This rather ambitious symposium explores thoroughly the problems and the
potential of the commercial corporation. That is, perhaps, all it set out to do. For
all that it accomplishes, though, it somehow falls short of the promise of its title.
The reader might have hoped, for instance, to read at least a comment on noncommercial corporations; the title does not dispel that hope. Some allusion to
the optimism expressed by Berle - that the corporation of today is the superstructure for the enlightened, functional democracy of the future-might at
least have been offered, if only to condemn it. Finally, even in the purely commercial area, the book's essays rely exclusively on educators and theoreticians. Nowhere,
so far as the authors' identification discloses, is the opinion or insight of a corporate
investor, or manager, or stockholder found. It may be that the men in executive
suite were given fair treatment in this always interesting undertaking, but they
can at least complain that they were under-represented.
Thomas L. Shaffer
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CRIME AND THE LAW
(Second Edition). By Jerome Hall.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1960. Pp. xii, 642. A complete revision of the 1947 edition to keep the book in harmony with its
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New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1960. $4.95. This is the autobiography of Sir Sydney Smith, former Dean of Edinburgh's Faculty of
Medicine. In it Sir Sydney describes his 50 years in medicine and his 30
years' association with crime and criminals. During these years, he has
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